This study examines intelligence at the operational level of war. Current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine fails to recognize an operational level intelligence function separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither does it identify the characteristics of intelligence at the operational level. Doctrine states that intelligence at the operational level of war is merely the "fusion" of tactical and strategic intelligence. This monograph posits that the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence is inadequate for the operational commander and that the very proposition reflects a serious void in military thinking. This study looks at several military actions at the operational level, outlines the peculiar characteristics of intelligence associated with those actions and suggests a number of considerations for those who deal with intelligence at the operational level of war. Among the conclusions to be drawn from this paper are: the U.S. Army lacks a refined operational intelligence perspective, the operational art demands that an operational intelligence perspective be thoroughly developed and examined for its doctrinal implications, and doctrine needs to be reexamined and rewritten to describe adequately the characteristics and functions of intelligence at the operational level of war. This operational intelligence perspective then needs to be promulgated to commanders and intelligence officers at all level of the military and throughout the intelligence community.