Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Special Operations Command determines its force levels and the readiness of its special operations forces.
GAO found that: (1) the Command has not substantially changed its force structure since 1988; (2) the Command determines its future force structure requirements by analyzing its wartime and peacetime needs; (3) nearly 50 percent of the Command's planned force structure is needed to meet peacetime requirements including peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian assistance; (4) there has only been a slight improvement in the readiness of the Command's special operations forces; (5) shortages of equipment and specialty personnel in active and reserve forces have been primary causes for the lack of significant combat readiness improvements; (6) although the Status of Resources and Training System is used to measure combat readiness, the Command believes that the system does not adequately reflect the capabilities and interoperability of its forces; and (7) the Department of Defense could increase the resources available and improve the readiness of special operations forces by using Air Force and Army special operations units for conventional combat search and rescue operations, and special operations funds to maintain excess reserve forces and expenses that are not unique to special operations.