After the September 11 attacks, the highest-level U.S. government officials publiclydeclared that the fight against al Qaeda financing was as critical as the fight against alQaeda itself. It has been presented as one of the keys to success in the fight againstterrorism: if we choke off the terrorists' money, we limit their ability to conduct masscasualty attacks. In reality, completely choking off the money to al Qaeda and affiliatedterrorist groups has been essentially impossible. At the same time, tracking al Qaedafinancing has proven a very effective way to locate terrorist operatives and supportersand to disrupt terrorist plots.As a result, the U.S. terrorist financing strategy has changed from the early post-9/11days. Choking off the money remains the most visible aspect of our approach, but it is notour only, or even most important, goal. Ultimately, making it harder for terrorists to getmoney is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of our overall strategy. Following themoney to identify terrorist operatives and sympathizers provides a particularly powerfultool in the fight against terrorist groups. Use of this tool almost always remains invisibleto the general public, but it is a critical part of the overall campaign against al Qaeda.Moreover, the U.S. government recognizes appropriately, in the Commission staff'sview that terrorist-financing measures are simply one of many tools in the fight againstal Qaeda.